Patent Law by Turnage, Patricia A.
Golden Gate University Law Review
Volume 14




Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Golden Gate University Law Review by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
jfischer@ggu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Patricia A. Turnage, Patent Law, 14 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. (1984).
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol14/iss1/11
PATENT LAW 
SARKISIAN V. WINN PROOF CORPORATION: WHEN THE 
RESULT IS A SURPRISE, TWO PLUS TWO MUST EQUAL 
FIVE 
A. INTRODUCTION: 
The Ninth Circuit and other circuits have wrestled with the 
meaning of "synergism" as it applies to the patentability of com-
bination patents. l The circuits have not agreed as to the proper 
standard for synergism,2 resulting in inconsistent adjudication of 
patents throughout the circuits. In Sarkisian v. Winn Proof Cor-
poration,a the Ninth Circuit, sitting en bane, held that the "un-
usual or surprising results" test is the sole and exclusive measure 
of patentability for combination patents.· 
FACTS OF THE CASE 
In 1970, Sarkisian filed a patent for a lightweight, portable 
sign stand with a virtually weightless base.1I Sarkisian's stand 
could withstand wind conditions of up to 80 m.p.h. without 
"walking" or tipping over, and would deflect away from the line 
1. Republic Industries Inc. v. Schlage Lock Co., 592 F.2d 963, 969 (7th Cir. 1979). 
See also Gettleman Mfg., Inc. v. Lawn "N" Sport, 517 F.2d 1194, 1199 (7th Cir. 1975). 
(the elements must take on a surprising quality); E-T Industries, Inc. v. Whittaker 
Corp., 523 F.2d 636, 641 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 870 (1976) (the combina-
tion must produce a result other than the anticipated sum of the separate parts); 
Panduit Corp. v. Burndy Corp., 517 F.2d 535, 539 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 987 
(1975) (the elements must, in the aggregate, produce new, unusual or striking results); 
Reese v. Elkhart Welding & Boiler Works, Inc., 447 F.2d 517, 526 (7th Cir. 1971) (the 
results must be unachieved by prior art structures). 
2. Rengo Co. Ltd. v. Molina Mach. Co., 657 F.2d 535 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 
1055 (1981). 
3. Sarkisian v. Winn-Proof Corp., 697 F.2d 1313 (9th Cir. 1983) (per Alarcon, J., 
Canby, J., and Hoffman, D.J.) aff'g, 688 F.2d 647 (1982). 
4. 688 F.2d at 650. 
5. Testimony indicated that existing sign stands were made with bases of no less 
than 75 lbs. 697 F.2d at 1319. The stands had to be weighted down with 200 to 300 lbs. 




Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1984
184 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14:183 
of traffic when struck by a vehicle.6 This unusual stability re-
sulted from the use of "pre-loaded" springs to connect the sign 
with its base.7 
While the first patent was pending,S Sarkisian filed a second 
patent application9 which extended the coverage of the original 
patent's monopoly.Io Along with the second application, Sarki-
sian filec:l a terminal disclaimer,ll which waived his right to an 
extension of the seventeen-year monopoly granted by the first 
patent. 
In 1975, defendant William Werner developed a spring 
mounted· sign stand designed to hold large display boards. Most 
. of the stands were sold without the display boards. Although 
Werner's sign stand differed in appearance from Sarkisian's sign 
stand,12 it utilized the same operating principle of "loaded 
springs" which Sarkisian had developed.13 
Subsequently, Sarkisian filed an action14 claiming the distri-
6. [d. at 1319. 
7. [d. at 1315. 
8. An issued patent grants to the patentee a seventeen-year period in which other 
persons are estopped from producing, using or selling his patented device without first 
gaining the patentee's permission. [d. at 13~4. 
9. The claims in the second patent were broader than the claims in the first patent. 
[d. The spring mechanism in the second patent is claimed as a pair of "spring means", 
rather than as a pair of "coil springs" in compression, as in the first patent. [d. Also, the 
legs of the second patent are described simply as "ground engaging means", eliminating 
the limitation of "generally parallel legs claimed" in the first patent. [d. 
10. After the first application is granted, the original patent's seventeen-year mo-
nopoly is impermissibly extended until the second patent expires, denying the public its 
statutory right to use the invention at the end of the first monopoly period. [d. 
11. Terminal disclaimers are submitted pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 253 (1952) to over-
come double patenting problems. The purpose of the terminal disclaimer is to terminate 
that portion of the second application which would otherwise extend beyond the expira-
tion date of the first patent. [d. 
12. Although Werner's sign stands were designed to hold large display boards, they 
were sold, for the most part, without display boards. 697 F.2d at 1316. 
13. These spaced-apart springs, i.e., springs not located on the same vertical axis, 
were sufficiently rigid to hold the display board in an upright position during ordinary 
conditions. [d. at 1315. The "initial" or "pre-loaded" degree of the compression of the 
springs, measured by the amount of force required to separate their coils, was set in 
relation to the length and weight of the bases, the location of the sign stand's center of 
. gravity, and the dimensions and weight of the display board. [d. This precise spring 
compression enabled Sarkisian's lightweight based stand to remain upright during high 
winds. [d. 
14. The action was filed against defendants Winn-Proof, William Werner and Wer-
Nel Enterprises. [d. 
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bution of the Werner device constituted a patent infringement. 
Defendants contended there was no infringement, as both pat-
ents were invalid; the first for failure to meet the requirements 
of 35 U.S.C. § 103111 for nonobviousness, the second for double 
patenting. The trial court held that the first patent was valid 
and infringed, but the second patent was invalid for double 
patenting. 
On appeal, a Ninth Circuit panel affirmed the validity and 
infringement of the first patent, holding that the patent was 
nonobvious.18 The panel reversed as to the double patenting and 
found infringement of the second patent as well. I? Following 
consolidation with two other cases,18 the Ninth Circuit ordered a 
rehearing en banc.le 
B. BACKGROUND: 
The Patent Act of 1793 provided that if any new invention 
was to be patented, it had to be both new and usefuPO As inven-
tions using old elements began to appear, the courts became 
hesitant to uphold patents for inventions that were similar to 
prior inventions.21 
The Supreme Court in Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. 
15. Section 103 provides in relevant part: 
A patent may not be obtained . . . if the differences between 
the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are 
such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvi-
ous at the time the invention was made to a person having 
ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. 
35 U.S.C. § 103. 
16. 686 F.2d 671 (9th Cir. 1981). 
, 17. [d. at 689. .' 
18. Carson Mfg. Co. Inc. v. Carsonite International Corp. Inc., 658 F.2d 1306 (9th 
Cir. 1981); Hammerquist v. Clarke's Sheet Metal, Inc., 658 F.2d 1319 (9th Cir. 1981). 
19. The en banc panel held that if a combination patent (a patent for a device con-
taining old elements which produce a new result) is to be nonobvious, it must produce an 
unusual or surprising result. 688 F.2d at 651. On remand, the three-judge panel held that 
plaintiff's first patent was valid as it did produce an unusual or surprising result and that 
the second patent was valid as there had been no double patenting. 697 F.2d at 1313. 
Further, that defendants were liable for patent infringement of both patents. [d. at 1323 
n.22. 
20. 592 F.2d at 967. 
21. Hotchkiss v. Gree:twood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1851); Great Atlantic & Pacific 
Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950). 
3
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Supermarket Equipment Corp.,22 for the first time defined the 
standard applicable for determining the validity of a combina-
tion patent. In reviewing the patentability of a three-sided 
rack,23 the Court noted that the key to patentability is the pres-
ence or lack of invention,24 but added that this standard be-
comes inherently elusive when applied to a combination of old 
elements.ill The Supreme Court explained that the test for com-
bination patents turns on whether the whole device in some way 
exceeds the sum of its parts; if it does, the accumulation of de-
vices using old parts is patentable.28 The Court reversed the 
lower court's finding of patentability':" concluding that plain-
tiff's device did not meet the appropriate standard for it exhib-
ited no unusual or surprising consequences from the unification 
of old elements. Further, the Supreme Court directed that the 
lower courts should scrutinize combination patent claims with a 
standard of care proportionate to the difficulty and improbabil-
ity of finding invention in an assembly of old elements.2s 
Prior to the revision of the patent laws in 1952,29 only nov-
elty and utility were used in determining the patentability of an 
invention.30 The 1952 revision additionally required nonobvious-
ness as a condition of patentability.31 In subsequent years there 
was confusion in the federal courts in determining the nonobvi-
22. 340 U.S. at 150. 
23. The rack was designed to draw or push goods placed within it on a grocery 
counter from one place to another. [d. at 152. 
24. [d. at 151. 
25. In citing prior Supreme Court cases, the Court stated that the accumulation of 
old devices is patentable only when the whole in some way exceeds the sum of its parts. 
The Court was concerned that a mere aggregation of known elements would not produce 
a new or different function. The Court noted that except in chemistry, this standard was 
difficult to attain. [d. at 151-52. 
26. [d. 
27. [d. at 152. 
28. [d. 
29. Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 798 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 
101-99 (1952». 
30. Patent Act of 1793, ch. XI. § 1, 1 Stat. 318. 
31. Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 798. Section 103 states that: 
a patent may not be obtained if the differences between the 
subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are 
such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvi-
ous at the time the invention was made to a person having 
ordinary skill in the art. . . . 
35 U.S.C. § 103. 
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ousness required by section 103.82 
In Graham v. John Deere CO.,88 section 103 finally received 
a definitive interpretation by the Supreme Court.8. The Court in 
Graham recognized that section 103 was only one of three condi-
tions which had to be satisfied for patentability, and that when 
determining whether a patent was nonobvious, the court must 
make three factual inquiries: (1) the scope and content of the 
prior art; (2) differences between the prior art and the claims at 
issue; and (3) the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art. 86 
The Supreme Court first applied the Graham analysis in . 
determining the validity of a combination patent in Anderson's-
Black Rock v. Pavement Co.8e The Court, rejecting a combina-
tion patent for a bituminous paving machine which combined a 
radiant heat burner and an asphalt shaper apparatus, empha-
sized the importance of strictly adhering to the requirements set 
forth in Graham.87 The Court reasoned that the combination of 
putting the burner together with the other elements in one ma-
chine, though perhaps a matter of great convenience, did not 
produce a "new or different function"; therefore, the combina-
tion was not an invention under the nonobviousness standard.88 
32. In Technical Tape Corp. v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 247 F.2d 343 (2d Cir. 
1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 952 (1958), the court said, "A novel combination of old 
elements which cooperate with each other 80 as to produce a new and useful result is 
patentable." Id. at 347; accord Weller Mfg. Co. v. Wen Products, Inc., 231 F.2d 795, 798 
(7th Cir. 1956). See also Brown v. Brock, 240 F.2d 723, 727 (4th Cir. 1957) ("The conten-
tion of obviousness is ... conceived after the event ... 'obviousness' is often much 
clearer after the event than before .... "); Jeoffroy Mfg. Inc. v. Graham, 219 F.2d 511 
(5th Cir. 1955) cert. denied, 350 U.S. 926 (1955) ("An improvement combination is pat-
entable even though its constituent elements are singly revealed by the prior art where 
... it produces a useful result in a cheaper and otherwise more advantageous way."); 
Reiner v. I. Leon Co., 285 F.2d 501, 503 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied. 366 U.S. 929 (1961) 
("The test laid down is indeed misty enough. It directs us to surmise what was the range 
of ingenuity of a person 'having ordinary skill' in an 'art' with which we are totally unfa-
miliar .... "); Copease Mfg. Co. v. Amn. Photocopy Equipment Co., 298 F.2d 772 (7th 
Cir. 1961); Int'l Mfg. Co. v. Landon, Inc., 336 F.2d 723 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 
Jacuzzi Bros., Inc. v. Landon, Inc., 379 U.S. 988 (1965); McCullough Tool co. v. Well 
Surveys, Inc., 343 F.2d 381 (1Oth Cir. 1965), cert denied, 383 U.S. 933 (1966). 
33. 383 U.S. 1 (1966). 
34. 592 F.2d at 968. 
35. 383 U.S. at 17. 
36. 396 U.S. 57 (1969). 
37. Id. at 62. 
38. Id. at 63. 
5
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In Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc.,s9 the Supreme Court reaffirmed 
the Graham test for patentability of a combination patent.40 
The Court considered the scope and content of the prior art to-
gether with the differences between the art and the claimed in-
vention.41 The Court reversed the lower court's finding of pat-
entability and stated that the patent had failed the synergism 
test.42 
Ninth Circuit: 
In Penn Int'l Industries v. Pennington Corp.,4S the Ninth 
Circuit reviewed the patentability of a waterbed in light of its 
obviousness as compared to previously manufactured waterbeds. 
The Ninth Circuit for the first time explained that a combina-
tion patent had to demonstrate an "unusual or surprising result" 
to warrant patentability under the non obviousness standard!4 
In Palmer v. Orthokinetics, Inc.,." the Ninth Circuit re-
viewed the patentability of a "travel chair", which simplified the 
process of moving a wheel chair bound person in and out of an 
automobile. The lower court held that since the chair's function 
was neither unexpected nor nonobvious, it failed the synergism 
test.48 The appellant argued that the court incorrectly applied 
the synergism test in determining patent validity. Without re-
39. 425 u.s. 273 (1975). 
40. [d. at 280. 
41. The patent was for a device that used a combination of old elements to produce 
an abrupt release of water directly onto a barn floor from storage pools or tanks to re-
move animal waste. [d. at 275-77. 
42. The Supreme Court stated that plaintiff's patent simply arranged old elements 
of a flushing system, with each element performing the same function it had been known 
to perform in the past. [d. at 282. The old elements delivered water directly rather than 
through pipes or hoses to the barn Boor. [d. The Court explained that although the de-
vice was a faster, cheaper and more convenient way to flush barns, it did not warrant 
patentability as it had not produced a new or different function. [d. 
43. 583 F.2d 1078 (9th Cir. 1978). 
44. [d. at 1082. The Ninth Circuit continued to require an unusual or surprising 
result to establish the validity of a combination patent in Herschensohn v. Hoffman, 593 
F.2d 893 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 842 (1979). In Herschensohn the court re-
viewed the validity of a patent for a hairbrush. The brush contained a flexible spine 
coupled with "bristle carrying fingers" which extended laterally on each side of the spine. 
[d. at 896. Plaintiffs contended that the spine and the vents between the "finger mem-
bers" allowed the brush to be pulled through the hair with ease and that this was an 
unusual or surprising result. [d. The Ninth Circuit disagreed and reversed the district 
court's finding of a valid patent. [d. 
45. 611 F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1980). 
46. [d. at 318. 
6
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jecting the synergism test, the Ninth Circuit reversed the dis-
trict court's finding and remanded the matter for further consid-
eration and determination of nonobviousness under Graham.4 ? 
In 1982, the Ninth Circuit considered the patentability of 
two combination patents.48 The court held that if a combination 
patent were to satisfy the nonobviousness standard in Graham, 
it must pass the synergism test and result in new and unex-
pected characteristics at the time of manufacture.49 
Recently, in Rite-Nail Packaging Corp. v. Berryfast, Inc.,50 
the Ninth Circuit reviewed the patentability of a 'carrier wheel 
which fed articles into a machine to be encapsulated by plastic. 
The court found the patent invalid on the grounds that it was a 
combination patent which did not produce a new and surprising 
or unusual result: 51 
Other Circuits: 
The Seventh Circuit in Republic Industries Inc. v. Schlage 
Lock Co. &2 was the first of the three circuits to reject syner-
gism. &8 The Republic court reasoned that the term synergism 
was misused, noting that most mechanical devices consist of 
parts which interact with each other; therefore, the presence or 
absence of synergism proved little. &4 In contrast to the focus on 
the after effects under the synergism approach, section 103 pro-
vides that the standard of patentability is the nonobviousness of 
an invention "at the time the invention was made .... "55 The 
court further noted that since synergism focused exclusively on 
the performance of the elements after they were combined and 
without regard to the obviousness or nonobviousness of making 
the combination, synergism did not comport with the Graham 
47. [d. at 323-25. 
48. Smith Int'l Inc. v. Hughes Tool Co., 664 F.2d 1373 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 
456 U.S. 976 (1982); Omark Indus. Inc. v. Textron, Inc., 688 F.2d 1242 (9th Cir. 1982). 
49. 664 F.2d at 1376; 688 F.2d at 1249. 
50. 706 F.2d 933 (9th Cir. 1983). 
51. [d. at 935. 
52. 592 F.2d 963. 
53. The Republic court viewed synergism as only a figure of speech since no result is 
actually greater than the sum of its parts. [d. at 970. 
54. [d. 
55: [d. at 971. 
7
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mandate to apply section 103.&6 The court stated that since sec-
tion 103 applied to all patent claims, there was no justification 
for measuring the patentability of a combination patent by a 
different standard than other inventions. &7 The Tenth and Third 
Circuits have also rejected synergism. &8 
Other circuit courts' have refrained from using synergism 
and have continued to apply the Graham factual analysis.&9 
Double Patenting 
In determining d~uble patenting questions, the Court of 
Customs and Patent Appeals has set forth a two-step process to 
be used by the courts.60 If one of the claims can be literally in-
fringed without literally infringing the other, then the claims are 
not the same and the focus shifts to whether one claim is an 
obvious variation of the other. If no obvious variations exist, 
then there has been no double patenting.6} 
C. ANALYSIS BY THE COURT: 
The en bane panel, in reviewing the meaning of the term 
synergism noted that the Supreme Court has yet to define the 
term.62 The court stated that a close reading of previous Ninth 
Circuit holdings reveals that synergism has always been the 
functional equivalent of the "unusual or surprising results" test 
56.Id. 
57.Id. 
58. In Plastic Container Corp. v. Continental Plastics, 607 F.2d 885 (10th Cir. 1979), 
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1018 (1980), the Tenth Circuit followed the Seventh Circuit's re-
jection of "synergism." Id. at 904-05. The Tenth Circuit now applies the Graham test 
only to decide patentability of all patents. See, e.g., Escoa Fintube Corp. v. Tranter, Inc., 
631 F.2d 682, 696 (10th Cir. 1980) (wherein the Tenth Circuit held a patent for a serrat-
ed fin heat exchange and for a method of continuously welding segmented fin stock to a 
cylindrical tube by high frequency resistance method was obvious in view of the prior art 
and therefore there had been no infringement of plaintiff's patent); Rengo Co. Ltd. v. 
Molins Mach. Co., 657 F.2d 535, 546 (3d Cir. 1981) cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1055 (1981) 
(where the Third Circuit reviewed the validity of a patent for a corrugator, a machine 
that manufactured 3-ply paperboard from which familiar cardboard boxes are made, and 
held that the Graham test was the proper test to be applied to all patents). 
59. See Whitley v. Road Corp., 624 F.2d 698 (5th Cir. 1980); Square Liner 360° Inc. 
v. Chisum, 691 F.2d 362 (8th Cir. 1982); Smith v. ACME General Corp., 614 F.2d 1086 
(6th Cir. 1980); In re Kollman, 595 F.2d 48 (1979). 
60. Application of Vogel, 422 F.2d 438 (9th Cir. 1970). 
61. If an obvious variation exists, a terminal disclaimer is required to prevent an 
extension of the seventeen-year monopoly granted by a patent. Id. at 441-42. 
62. 688 F.2d at 649. 
8
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for assessing nonobviousness under 35 U.S.G. § 103.68 In recog-
nizing a need for precision and consistency, the court held that 
the unusual or surprising results test is the sole and exclusive 
measure of patentability for combination patents in the Ninth 
Circuit.6• 
In applying the test, the en bane panel reviewed the with-
drawn decision in Sarkisian66 and concluded that the three-
judge panel had disavowed the test established in Great Atlan-
tic requiring unusual or surprising results for patentability of 
combination patents.66 The court stated that the lower court's 
analysis was unacceptable in that it would lower the standard of 
patentability for combination patents.6 '7 
The en banc panel remanded Sarkisian to the three-judge 
panel for a determination of whether the sign stand produced an 
unusual or surprising result. The court explained that by reaf-
firming the unusual or surprising results test, it was complying 
with the constitutional standard set out in Graham and embod-
ied in section 103.68 
On remand, the three-judge panel upheld the validity of 
plaintiff's device. It was nonobvious, the panel noted, since it 
clearly met the "unusual or surprising results" test.69 The panel 
discussed in detail the functions of each of the elements in 
plaintiff's stand. '70 To further strengthen this determination, the 
63. ld. 
64. ld. at 650. 
65. 686 F.2d 671. 
66. 688 F.2d at 650. 
67. ld. 
68. The court stated that "obviousness" is a term of art and the unusual or surpris-
ing results formulation merely clarifies the obviousness standard. ld. The test also ex-
pressed the need to exercise caution in determining patentability of combination patents. 
ld. 
69. 697 F.2d at 1318. 
70. The panel acknowledged the similarity between the "spaced apart" legs on 
plaintiff's device and those used in a Thompson base but noted that the function of the 
legs on plaintiff's sign stand was to withstand an impinging force, making the sign wind 
proof. ld. There was no evidence that Thompson's sign stand possessed this characteris-
tic. ld. The panel next considered the function of the "spaced apart" springs and found 
that they controlled the direction of the sign stand away from the line of traffic when 
struck by a vehicle. ld. at 1319. No other sign stand could perform in a similar manner. 
ld. The lightweight base on plaintiff's stand provided surprising stability.ld. at 1320. All 
other bases on other sign stands required a minimum of 75 Ibs. each to maintain the 
9
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panel also considered the "secondary" indicia of nonobviousness 
as outlined by the Supreme C'ourt in Graham.71 
The panel next considered whether defendants' stand was 
an infringement of plaintiff's patent. To decide infringement the 
panel applied the doctrine of equivalents.72 The purpose of this 
doctrine, according to the panel, was to reward the inventor for 
his or her invention; therefore, patents which represent impor-
tant and significant advances in relevant technology would be 
entitled to a broader range of equivalents than those patents 
which represent a rather small advance in a crowded field.'18 The 
panel agreed with the district court that plaintiff's device was 
entitled to a broad range of equivalents in that it represented a 
significant advance in the field of unanchored, readily portable, 
windproof sign stands. '14 The panel affirmed the district court's 
determination that the differences between defendants' signs 
and plaintiff's patent were insignificant and the devices were the 
equivalents of the device claimed in the first patent,'15 thereby 
constituting patent infringement. '18 
The panel compared the plaintiff's two patents and found 
that there had been no double patenting.7 '1 Accordingly, the 
same stability. Id. 
71. These considerations are (1) the commercial success of the device and (2) long 
felt but unaolved needs and prior unsuccessful attempts to solve the problem ultimately 
addressed by the new invention. 383 U.S. at 17-18. The panel found that the evidence of 
record fully supported the lower court's findings that (1) plaintiff's sign had enjoyed 
substantial commercial success, (2) plaintiff's sign had solved the longstanding problem 
of "walking" and tipping over in high winds, and (3) other companies had been unauc-
cessful in their efforts to produce a "readily portable" road sign. 697 F.2d at 1320. 
72. Under this test, two devices are considered to be the same if they do substan-
tially the same work in substantially the same manner, and accomplish substantially the 
same results. Id. at 1321 (quoting Union Paper Bag Machine Co. v. Murphy, 97 U.S. 120, 
125 (1878». 
73. 697 F.2d at 1322. 
74. Id. at 1320. 
75.Id. 
76. The court reasoned that although defendant Werner's stands were generally sold 
without signs, they were specifically designed to hold signs, and therefore, resembled 
plaintiff's invention. Id. at 1323. 
77. The panel expressed an awareness that "double patenting" is a difficult area of 
patent law. Id. at 1324. Applying the Vogel test, the panel found that although the two 
patents overlapped, they were not the same. Id. at 1326. Rather, obvious variation 
double patenting was involved. Id. The panel noted that the Ninth Circuit has previ-
ously indicated that "obviousness" type double patenting does nqt automatically void 
subsequent patent applications if the later application will not extend the original pat-
ent's monopoly. Id. . 
10
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panel reversed the district court's finding of validity of both 
patents.78 
D. CRITIQUE: 
The Ninth Circuit in Sarkisian held that a determination of 
an unusual or surprising result (synergism) is necessary for a 
finding of nonobviousness of a combination patent. By using the 
synergism test as the means of assessing nonobviousness under 
35 U.S.C. section 103, the Ninth Circuit imposes a stricter stan-
dard than required by the Supreme Court in Graham. Consider-
ing that the Supreme Court admonished lower courts to strictly 
adhere to the Graham test, this standard is inappropriate. 
Moreover, the Ninth Circuit action was unnecessary. The Gra-
ham standard is totally adequate for determining obviousness 
under section 103. It is immaterial that Sarkisian involved a 
combination patent. The statute makes no distinction and the 
Supreme Court had no difficulty applying the Graham analysis 
to a combination patent.79 
Finally, the synergism test is unworkable. By applying syn-
ergism, the Ninth Circuit overlooked two major flaws in the syn-
ergism approach. First, the synergism approach is based on the 
assumption that it is always obvious to take known elements 
and combine them,80 discounting that the selection of the ele-
ments themselves may be nonobvious and inasmuch inventive.81 
Accordingly, bona fide inventions displaying such nonobvious se-
lection would be excluded from being patented. 
The second flaw in the synergism approach is that it over-
looks. the fact that in mechanical patents, it is only a remote 
possibility that constituent parts which perform known and ex-
pected functions would function differently when combined so 
that an unusual result would be produced.81 Thus, in theory, 
78. [d. The panel concluded there had been no double patenting 88 the terminal 
disclaimer filed by plaintiff eliminated any danger of extending the monopoly. [d. 
79. 396 U.S. at 62. 
SO. 592 F.2d at 971. 
81. [d. 
82. 657 F.2d at 545. As Judge Learned Hand noted: 
All machines are made up of the same elements: rods, pawls,· 
pitmans, journals, toggles, gears, cams, and the like, all acting 
their parts 88 they always do and always must. . . But the ele-
ments are capable of an infinity of permutations and the selec-
11
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mechanical patents would, rarely be upheld; in practice the stan-
dard becomes subjective, depending primarily upon the judge's 
degree of surprise. While synergism or unusual or surprising re-
sults may indicate nonobviousness, the absence of it should play 
no role in evaluating obviousness under 35 U.S.C. Section 103. 
Patricia A. Turnage* 
tion of that group which proves serviceable to a given need 
may require a high degree of originality. It is that act which is 
the invention. . . . 
[d. (citing B. G. Corp. v. Walter Kidde & Co., 79 F.2d 20, 22 (2d Cir. 1935) (emphasis 
added». . 
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